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RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT OF LAWS BY FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW
James A.R. Nafzigert
THE ISSUE: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
A recurring problem in a federal system is to determine the
applicability of state law in international cases before civil
courts. In the United States this problem arises in both state
courts and federal courts considering cases under diversity juris-
diction. From one viewpoint, rules applicable in domestic cases
ought generally to apply in international cases as well. Thus,
state law should apply in international cases when it would ordi-
narily apply in domestic cases. An important corollary is that
federal common law should not displace state law except when
federal interests are unusually compelling. This is generally the
rule today. A contending argument, however, favors a more fully
federalized choice of law to replace state law in both federal and
state courts.
In an able exposition of the latter argument' Professor
Daniel Chow proposes that "when the use of state law to decide
international choice of law issues may compromise significant
federal interests, federal and state courts should apply a federal
common law rule that preempts state law."2 In constitutional
terms, this means essentially that whenever a choice of state law
by a court might impede the exercise of foreign relations powers
attributed to the federal government, federal common law
should replace state law.' Later, in discussing an appropriate
choice of law rule for international cases, Professor Chow ap-
t B.A., M.A., J.D.; Professor of Law and Director of the China Program, Willamette
University College of Law.
Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Com-
mon Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA L. Rav. 165 (1988) (emphasis added).
Id. at 169.
Compare this with U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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pears to modify his proposition slightly as follows: "cases affect-
ing foreign relations interests would be decided using the same
federal choice of law rule."" Presumably, this statement of the
appropriate choice of law contemplates only those cases where
foreign relations interests, but not necessarily significant ones,
actually would be affected, rather than all cases where they
might be affected. Finally, in the conclusion of the article, the
central proposition is stated in an even more qualified manner:
"Federal and state courts should undertake this federal common
law analysis on a case-by-case basis and apply a federal rule to
an international choice of law issue only after a considered judg-
ment that state law would compromise significant federal inter-
ests."5 As articulated, the proposition comes close to restating
current rules of law. Although the precise contours of Professor
Chow's proposition are therefore somewhat unclear, he seems to
prefer throughout his analysis the relatively radical version
stated at the beginning of this paragraph. For convenience, we
may call this the "federal presumption" argument. The follow-
ing critique questions both the necessity and the efficacy of that
argument. Professor Chow has, in any event, examined a prob-
lem that ought to be of fundamental interest to everyone con-
cerned about the further development of a just choice of law
process in international cases.
The issue of whether state law should be replaced by federal
common law in international cases has become more significant
as those cases have become more frequent in the courts. Like-
wise, national and international legislation designed to regulate
transnational activity and dispute resolution is becoming more
common.6 We are ever more a global community. The federal
Chow, supra note 1, at 214 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
6 E.g., S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 5370 (1985) (a proposal to use
arbitration and other means to simplify and alleviate problems in the application of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a) (2)-(4), 1391 (f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1988)) [hereinafter FSIA]);
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, opened for signature July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 (entered into
force Aug. 23, 1972); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. For in-depth discussion see Bilder, An Over-
view of International Dispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DiS. RES. 1 (1986); see also
[Vol. 2:67
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presumption argument asserts that because international cases
are becoming more common and decisions arising from them
may affect the foreign relations powers of the federal govern-
ment, there is a need to develop a body of federal common law
to supplant state law in order to protect the federal, more or less
"national," interest. Both the minor premise and the conclusion
of this argument, however, may be questioned. Just because a
case is international does not mean that the foreign relations or
other interests of the federal government are affected signifi-
cantly enough to replace the normal application of state law. In
fact, they usually are not. Quite the opposite may be more char-
acteristic. Particularly if the interests of the federal government
in a given matter are limited, they may be best served by not
being spotlighted. Discretion may be the better part of diplo-
matic valor.
Even when federal interests are significantly affected, it is
reasonable to expect that existing rules and principles ensure
the application of federal law rather than conflicting state law.
The most important of these overriding rules and principles are
well established within the existing framework for resolving in-
ternational cases: the act of state doctrine;7 treaty law;8 Acts of
Congress;9 transnational judicial cooperation; 10 the principle of
Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 471
(1989); Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of International Adjudi-
cation, 1 EMORY J. INT'L. Disp. RES 131 (1987); Berman, the Law of International Com-
mercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT'L. DIsp. RES. 235 (1988).
7 "[T]he courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the govern-
ment of another, done within its own territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
Earlier important cases applying the act of state doctrine include Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) and Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304
(1918). It has been asserted that the doctrine does not bar adjudication when the State
Department determines that the foreign relations of the United States will not be im-
paired. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij
(Chemical Bank & Trust Co., Third-Party Defendant), 210 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1954).
However, the acceptability of the Bernstein doctrine is open to serious question. See also
W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
0 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
Id. Examples of these acts are: FSIA, supra note 6; Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
1350 (1988).
"0 See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United
States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302; Treaty on Extradition and Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 1, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111,
1990]
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comity;" and fundamental policies of dispute resolution." A
case in point is Philippines v. Marcos,'5 involving a clear federal
interest in cooperating with the Philippine government to effect
the return of assets alleged to have been illegally taken out of its
territory by deposed President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife.
In choice of forum disputes, international public policy also
plays an important role, as the Supreme Court's opinions in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.," and Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth"s make clear. Fortunately, party autonomy
in contracting obviates most choice of law and jurisdictional
disputes.
The Erie and Klaxon doctrines" in diversity cases do not
pose a particular problem. A state's choice of law rules may take
T.I.A.S. No. 9891; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, June 12, 1981, United States-
Netherlands, T.I.A.S. No. 10734; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, November 9, 1982, United States-Italy, S. Exec. Doc. No. 98-25, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1984); Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, October 17, 1983, United
States-Morocco (not yet in force).
" See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (stating the principles of comity);
John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty., Ltd., v. Ludlow Jute Co., Ltd., 569 F.2d 696 (lst Cir.
1978); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Moore v. Mitchell, 30
F.2d 600, 603 (2nd Cir. 1929), aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
12 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie
du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974).
11 In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. dis-
missed sub nom. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of Philippines, 480 U.S. 942 (1987),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987), "the Republic of the Philippines sought an order
enjoining its deposed former leader, Ferdinand Marcos, from disposing of allegedly ill-
gotten real estate holdings in New York City and the surrounding area." Chow, supra
note 1, at 212. The federal district court granted the injunction. On appeal, the Second
Circuit upheld the exercise of federal question jurisdiction to permit the issuance of the
injunction, on the basis of a "powerful" federal interest in governing "the necessary im-
plications of such an action for United States foreign relations." Marcos, 806 F.2d at
353-54.
" Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing the arbitration
clause in a contract despite conflict with a federal statute).
" Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (The arbitra-
tion clause in a contract encompassing an antitrust counterclaim is enforceable and com-
pelling under the Federal Arbitration Act).
1" Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Courts are without authority to create
federal general common law except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress; state substantive law will ordinarily apply in federal cases based on
diversity jurisdiction), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (The Supreme Court held that under the Erie doctrine, a federal
court in a diversity case must apply the conflicts rules of the state in which it sits.), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 685 (1942).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/3
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into account federal, foreign or international interests, policies
and rules. State substantive law can and often does incorporate
these. Federal attempts to extend regulations abroad, legislation
to implement treaty law affecting private interests, clawback
provisions responding to regulatory overreaching, and so forth,
can all be given effect by existing exceptions to the Erie doctrine
in the federal courts and by ordinary choice of law rules by state
courts. While fundamental questions may arise concerning the
Erie doctrine in theory, as well as to its applicability in individ-
ual cases, it is at least subject to these important exceptions.
Thus, international cases would not seem to warrant any greater
judicial deference to federal authority than would be warranted
in domestic cases. Although Swift v. Tyson 17 lives on in many
international cases based on diversity jurisdiction, this does not
mean that the courts should broaden the Swift doctrine so as to
presume the application of federal law, much less require it. In
determining whether to apply federal common law, courts may
differ. However, current rules seem to strike an acceptable com-
promise between the interests of the federal system and the fed-
eral interest in systemizing international conflicts cases.
Thus, although the world may be getting smaller and inter-
national cases routine, it does not follow that federalizing the
law further is necessary for a fair and just resolution of interna-
tional cases within a federal system. Indeed, it is puzzling why, if
international transactions and legal cases are becoming routine,
they should not be handled routinely. One might reasonably
conclude that the more routine international cases become, the
more they should be routinely handled by applying ordinary
choice of law rules rather than federal common law. Accordingly,
the argument is strong that the latter should continue to be re-
served for special cases where the need for national uniformity
or for conveying a clear foreign relations or other federal mes-
sage is truly compelling.
7 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (pre-Erie rule of applying federal common law in all
diversity cases).
1990]
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE LAW
What is the jurisprudential source of the argument for fur-
ther federalizing the law in international cases? The hoary doc-
trine of inherent powers, fashioned by Justice Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,"' is a partial ex-
planation. 19 According to that doctrine, the political branches of
the federal government have inherent powers in the realm of
foreign relations under authority of the Constitution. Under an
expansive reading of the doctrine, courts may be obliged to de-
clare any case nonjusticiable that has even a single pertinent for-
eign element. The dead hand of the inherent powers doctrine
has been controversial in the half century of its existence.2"
Therefore, care should be exercised before allowing the doctrine
to tear further into the fabric of constitutional and private law
by enlarging the fiction of inherent foreign relations powers as a
means for further displacing the ordinary application of state
law.
As a political matter, a fully federalized choice of law in in-
ternational cases might well appeal to political conservatives, es-
pecially when the federal courts and the nation's agenda are
conservative. The reliance of the federal presumption argument
on Justice Sutherland's famous opinion in Curtiss-Wright to es-
tablish executive omnipotence in foreign affairs seems in accord
with this viewpoint.2 1
The federal presumption argument is, however, premised on
three additional observations: (1) that state courts are paro-
chial;2 2 (2) that they "do not have the correct analytic ingredi-
ents to measure an international choice of law situation";23 and
(3) that federalist fragmentation of choice of law doctrine frus-
trates the federal interests of the United States in the interna-
18 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
" For a brief critique of the doctrine see Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens
Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 823 (1983).
20 See Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporations: An Histori-
cal Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1 (1973).
21 Chow, supra note 1, at 204-205 n.214 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-33 (1936)).
22.Id. at 181, 224.
2" Id. at 223-24.
[Vol. 2:67
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tional context.24 Although the basis for the first two observations
is unclear, evidence for the third point includes the often bewil-
dering diversity of choice of law methodologies among state
courts and the observations of rather antiquated case law.2" Fur-
thermore, the same methodology may be unpredictably and pa-
rochially trumped by a public policy exception in favor of local
law. This may be viewed as a problem in international cases be-
cause, with several important exceptions, courts generally re-
solve interstate and international conflicts the same way.2 6 To-
day, however, there is surprising agreement among state courts,
at least on standards of applying the public policy exception.
Many state courts are surprisingly generous about the relative
strength and acceptability of a foreign state's interest as re-
flected, for example, in California's comparative impairment
technique for resolving a true conflict of laws.27
Although a federal system may present a confusing picture
to the outside world because of a welter of diverse state choice of
law rules and approaches, this apparent lack of uniformity may
not be as much of a problem as the contending choice of law
approaches might suggest.2 There is somewhat greater agree-
ment on an interest analysis used in the Restatement (Second)
of the Law of Conflict of Laws 2e than a mere classification of
diverse methodologies might suggest. Interest-oriented ap-
24 Id. at 181.
" Id. at 192 n.140.
20 See generally J. NAFZIGER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A NORTHWEST PERSPECTIVE 65-91
(1985).
17 The comparative impairment technique applies the law of the state whose inter-
est would be impaired to a greater degree if its law were not applied. See, e.g., Offshore
Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721 (1978) (California
applied Louisiana law instead of its own because the impairment of its interests was less
than what the impairment of Louisiana's interests would have been if California law had
been applied. The issue was whether a California corporate employer could recover dam-
ages from a Louisiana corporation for loss of services of a key employee, who was negli-
gently injured on the Louisiana corporation's premises.); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16
Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719,128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976) (California law was applied in this
instance to avoid impairment of its state interest in holding tavern owners liable for
injuries resulting from drunk driving accidents. California's interest was deemed to be
stronger than Nevada's interest in protecting tavern owners.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859
(1976).
88 For an alternative analysis, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 362-411 (3d ed. 1986).
2" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2, 6, 10 (1971).
1990]
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proaches do not ensure uniformity of decisions among multiple
jurisdictions, but they do enhance the likelihood of uniformity.
Also, under most modern approaches to choice of law, federal
courts oftenfind a false conflict of laws. 30 Indeed, in the modern
era of conflicts law, courts are encouraged to find a false conflict
of laws. British Columbia v. Gilbertson,1 which is a model of
this technique, found a false conflict between state and foreign-
sensitive federal law, although its reliance on the largely dis-
carded requirement of reciprocity as an element of international
comity is somewhat aberrant.
Conversely, the content of an expanded federal common law
would itself be somewhat difficult to discern. Even if federal
common law simply duplicated international law, which state
law is also competent to do, it is quite often subject to the vagar-
ies of common law analysis. Although treaties, like statutes, offer
somewhat of a black letter articulation of the law, they too re-
quire interpretation. Defining international custom is often even
more problematic. Custom, which is akin to the common law,
plays a particularly important role today in the contemporary
system of international law. Examples of this are: the World
Court's opinion in the Case Concerning Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and against Nicaragua;32 the opinions of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Honduras Disap-
pearances Cases;33 contemporary law of the sea without a bind-
ing, comprehensive treaty;3 4 the burgeoning field of refugee and
international immigration law, despite the aberrant opinion in
Garcia-Mir v. Meese;3 5 and the law of naval warfare36 all disclose
'0 A false conflict of laws arises when the laws in each jurisdiction either are identi-
cal or would produce the same effect. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 89 (1965).
" Her Majesty Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161
(9th Cir. 1979).
32 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 22 (Judgment of June 27).
33 Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. Human Rights 3, Ser. C, No. 4
(Judgment of July 29), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989); Godinez Cruz Case, 1989 Inter-
Am. Ct. Human Rights 3, Ser. C, No. 5 (Judgment of Jan. 20).
"I United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Decem-
ber 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 and Corr. 1-11, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982).
36 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986) (political act
supersedes custom).
36 See generally THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE (N. Ronzitti ed. 1988). A specific ex-
[Vol. 2:67
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the vital role of custom.
At the core of the federal presumption argument in interna-
tional cases is a perception that when state courts or federal
courts in diversity cases decide international conflicts issues they
are making "foreign policy"3 7 at least "in a significant number of
cases ... forbidden by the Constitution."38 It is argued that all
foreign affairs must be addressed by a central political authority,
not by a myriad of courts: "'the country must speak with a
united voice.' ' Why this is so is not entirely clear. After all,
this country's legal system could simply tell the rest of the
world, in effect, that courts in a federal system do not necessa-
rily speak with one voice except in matters where the political
branches insist that the courts do so, or where the courts must
do so in order to comply with international law or otherwise im-
plement strongly expressed national interests. It is also some-
what unclear why "it is now unacceptable for the United States
to have the treatment of foreign law (and thus federal interests)
depend on the policy of the state where the litigation happens to
take place." '
Professor Chow's article suggests that the threats to the in-
tegrity and uniformity of the judicial process by state courts
have become more acute because of three factors. First, as the
world gets smaller, litigation is becoming more international.41
That seems correct. The current framework of state and federal
law can and does, however, accommodate foreign parties' inter-
ample is the traditional doctrine of right of convoy, which prevents belligerents from
boarding and searching convoyed ships and instructs those wishing to examine cargoes to
be content with a statement by the commander of the convoy that no contraband is
being .transported. This was employed by the United States in the Persian Gulf during
the Iran/Iraq War. The United States employed this doctrine as a means of preventing
the Iranian Navy from exercising the doctrine of contraband which provides for the law-
ful visitation, search, and seizure of contraband. Id. at 7-8. Caspar W. Weinberger, then
United States Secretary of Defense, stated that "[tihe United States will be in full com-
pliance with international law in providing escort to the reflagged [Kuwaiti] tankers. In-
ternational law clearly recognizes the right of a neutral State to escort and protect its
flagged vessels in transit to neutral ports." 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 60 No. 2124 (1987).
'7 Chow, supra note 1, at 184.
Id. at 167.
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), quoted in Chow, supra note 1, at 189.
40 Chow, supra note 1, at 224.
" Id. at 168-69.
1990]
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ests and international interests. Second, foreign governments
now assume control over activities that were formerly private.2
Although that has indeed occurred, one might reasonably ask
whether the trend is not in the opposite direction. Major exam-
ples of this countertrend would include economic deregulation in
North America and Western Europe, and privatization in East-
ern Europe, Africa and Asia. The dramatic changes in Eastern
Europe may perhaps become the best evidence of this counter-
trend. 8 Third, it is argued that because of the first two factors,
what were formerly private disputes are now more apt to be im-
bued with public interest."4 The trend toward blending public
and private law into a system of transnational law may lead
some observers to the conclusion that the judicial system must
be more alert to the foreign policy implications of what formerly
were common domestic issues in state or federal diversity
cases.' 5 However, one might argue just the opposite; even if the
public sector is becoming more pervasive in international trans-
actions and therefore more involved in the process of private in-
ternational law, the sovereign is becoming just one more routine
player not meriting any special judicial concern.
Indeed, this is exactly the way Congress and the federal
courts seem to view the trends. Observe the codification of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, with its commercial ac-
tivities exception, in the FSIA.41 Witness, also, Congressional ac-
quiescence in governance by state law of numerous FSIA issues,
Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze 47 notwithstanding, and some
erosion of the act of state doctrine.'8
" Id. at 168-69, 193-94.
'3 The dismantling of communist control has encouraged some privatization of East-
ern European economies.
14 Chow, supra note 1, at 193-94.
4' Id. at 169.
46 FSIA, supra note 6, cited in Chow, supra note 1, at 195 n.154.
41 Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1987) discussed in Chow,
supra note 1, at 205 n.215 (applying federal common law for a choice of law rule).
11 See, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516
(2nd Cir. 1985) (Recognizing both inconsistent federal and foreign interests and consis-
tent federal and state (New York) interests, the court held that the act of state doctrine
did not bar inquiry into a dispute when the foreign act was a decree prohibiting repay-
ment of foreign currency obligations that required extraterritorial enforcement, and
therefore New York law applied), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
[Vol. 2:67
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APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW WITHIN
Zschernig-Erie/Klaxon FRAMEWORK
Even the celebrated opinion in Zschernig v. Miller,49 which
confines the scope of state law within a theory of federal pre-
emption, applies only in instances where state law provides for
and actually has led to "minute inquiries concerning the actual
administration of foreign law [and] into the credibility of foreign
diplomatic statements."5 On this point Zschernig is somewhat
ambiguous. In the words of Professor Louis Henkin:
It may be, then, that Zschernig v. Miller excludes only state ac-
tions that reflect a state policy critical of foreign governments and
involve "sitting in judgment" on them (footnote omitted) . . . Or
is the Court suggesting different lines-between state acts that
impinge on foreign relations only "indirectly or incidentally" and
those that do so directly or purposefully? (footnote omitted) Be-
tween those that "intrude" on the conduct of foreign relations
and those that merely "affect" them?5"
The basic rule, stated by Professor Henkin, nevertheless re-
mains. Interestingly, Justice Harlan, who had written for the
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,52 the classic act
of state doctrine case and the apotheosis of an exception to Erie,
delivered a concurring opinion in Zschernig in which he argued
against declaring the state statute unconstitutional as applied.53
Citing the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act54 and other authority of less significance today, Harlan ar-
gued that state courts must and do regularly engage in well-in-
formed scrutiny of foreign laws and legal systems. 5
Advocates of a more radical displacement of state law per-
ceive several specific inadequacies in the Zschernig framework.
Professor Chow, for example, cites four instances where courts
should have applied or should hypothetically apply federal com-
49 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
0 Id. at 435.
1' L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 240-41 (1972).
6' 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
s Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443-62.
Id. at 461-62, (citing Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act §
4(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 67. The most recent publication of the statute is located at 13 U.L.A.
268 (1986)).
" Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 461.
1990]
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mon law. These instances involve both state jurisdiction and
federal diversity jurisdiction under the Klaxon 56 extension of
Erie. They include: (1) the Marcos5" and Republic of Iraq58 bank
assets cases, according to which American courts may bar for-
eign decrees from reaching assets in this country;"' (2) a hypo-
thetical case based on the reach of Article VIII, section 2(b) of
the Bretton Woods (IMF) Agreement;60 (3) foreign debt forgive-
ness cases;6" and (4) the case of J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grin-
dlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd.,62 in which a state court refused to
give effect to an anti-Semitic decree of Idi Amin. The Marcos
and Republic of Iraq cases applied the act of state doctrine,
which is existing federal common law under Sabbatino. Any dis-
agreement we may have with the application of the doctrine in
these cases does not call for new federal common law. The hypo-
thetical case simply involves the application of treaty law, the
supreme law of the land. 3 Under existing law, the debt forgive-
ness cases can be handled, as in Allied Bank," by comparing the
strength of local interests with federal or foreign relations inter-
ests and properly applying the act of state doctrine.
Professor Chow's criticism of the Zschernig - Erie/Klaxon
6 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
685 (1942).
"' Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. dis-
missed sub nom. Ancor Holdings, N.V. v. Republic of the Philippines, 480 U.S. 942
(1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
" Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
50 See also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516
(2nd Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
"o Under Article VIII, section 2(b) an exchange contract between American citi-
zens and the nationals of another member of the IMF would be unenforceable in
the United States if the foreign nation enacted currency decrees prohibiting pay-
ment on the contract even if the contract were payable in the United States.
Chow, supra note 1, at 203 (discussing Article VIII, § 2(b), Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund (the Bretton Woods Agreement), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 1411, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775,
T.I.A.S. No. 6748, and Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937).
, Chow, supra note 1, at 209.
2 37 N.Y.2d 220, 227, 333 N.E. 2d 168, 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 899 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
3 Incidentally, letters of credit seem to be intentionally excluded from the scope of
Article VIII, § 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement, supra note 61.
" Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2nd Cir.
1985), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
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framework relies heavily on a critique of the Zeevi decision. In
Zeevi, the interests balanced were those of New York, in pro-
tecting its integrity as a financial center by routinely honoring
irrevocable letters of credit there, and Uganda's interest in up-
holding Idi Amin's discriminatory, anti-Semitic decree. Surely,
under these circumstances, the Zeevi decision was correct in giv-
ing effect to New York law and public policy, just as it would
have been appropriate to override Nazi confiscation measures or
decrees providing for confiscation of property without compen-
sation. In other cases, dealing with less offensive foreign laws
than Idi Amin's decree, New York courts might well give effect
to foreign exchange controls, even outside the scope of the Bret-
ton Woods commitment. Indeed, if the foreign interests were
compelling, as they certainly were not in Zeevi, courts might be
required to fashion federal common law under Swift in federal
diversity cases or by preemption of state law in state court cases.
Professor Chow acknowledges that the New York court ap-
plied local public policy to bar recognition of Idi Amin's decree
while assessing the foreign policy interests. 5 Thus, the New
York court was taking account of the federal interests and simu-
lating a federal common law; in any event, express application of
the latter would doubtlessly have produced the same result. Pro-
fessor Chow expresses concern that "the Zeevi court ignored the
possible political ramifications,"6 but the United States policy
was one of firm opposition to Idi Amin, regardless of potential
countermeasures by the latter. The decision therefore would
seem to have supported national policy, that is, the federal in-
terest. It is questionable whether Uganda, which was not a party
to the litigation, had any real interest, as Professor Chow im-
plies,6 7 in seeking foreign recognition of currency controls in pri-
vate litigation such as this between Mr. Zeevi and Grindlays
Bank.
The Zeevi decision is a reminder that in our federal system,
states may have paramount interests which may sometimes
merit as much respect as compelling foreign interests, and that
state courts are quite capable of taking into account the foreign
" Chow, supra note 1, at 184-85.
" Id. at 186.
7 Id. at 185-87.
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relations and other interests of the federal government. State
courts can also "move with the circumspection appropriate when
[a court] is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the con-
duct of our international relations." 68
If a state court should inappropriately transgress into the
domain of sensitive foreign policy, there is always the Zschernig
doctrine to bar any interference in the federal domain of foreign
relations. Moreover, federal and foreign interests do not necessa-
rily coincide; sometimes they may even be antagonistic. 9
CONCLUSION
Further federalizing choice of law in international cases to
create a presumption in favor of federal law is unnecessary. In
federal diversity cases the Erie/Klaxon doctrines provide suffi-
cient opportunity to take into account federal and foreign rela-
tions interests. In state court cases, the federal preemption doc-
trine of Zschernig is effective, although it will continue to
require further clarification by the courts. Its incompleteness as
a framework for determining the role of federal common law is
an inadequate reason for converting its curb on state law into a
presumption in favor of federal law. Like all common law, it will
"take many years and many cases to develop the distinctions
and draw the lines that will define the new limitations on the
states. '70 "[Wihile the preemptive scope of the foreign affairs
power is not capable of precise contours, it can be developed by
the courts on a case-by-case basis. 1 Zschernig seems equal to
this task. If properly though narrowly applied, the Zschernig
limitation on the reach of state courts should help, in most
cases, to vanquish the demons of state court parochialism and
federal fragmentation. The argument for a federal common law
in international cases is at its strongest when it limits the appli-
cation of that body of law to only the most sensitive, political
cases, such as the Marcos case. Such an application has been
provided for within the Zschernig framework.
68 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959).
6' Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
"0 L. HENKIN, supra note 51, at 239.
7 Chow, supra note 1, at 214.
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It may not be efficacious to further federalize the choice of
law process. Expanding federal common law to resolve interna-
tional conflict of laws, thus extending beyond the existing juris-
prudential framework, might not live up to its promise of stabi-
lizing expectations, enhancing predictability of the courts,
avoiding foreign policy conflicts, and generally overcoming the
fragmentation characteristic of a federal system. Professor Chow
suggests, for example, that the courts might "adopt a [choice of
law] rule from sources in domestic law, '7 2 but if the court finds
that such a rule would not be sufficiently sensitive to federal and
foreign interests, it should "turn to other sources of federal com-
mon law."'73 Three of these other sources are identified: the act
of state doctrine; but if it is deemed to be "too rigid and
mechanical," a "balancing approach" that takes account of a
multiplicity of factors; or simply a presumption in favor of for-
eign law.74 It is unclear how such an open texture of considera-
tions would support a more "stable and predictable . .. sys-
tem '7 5 of judicial decision-making. In sum, limiting the Erie!
Klaxon doctrine and otherwise presumptively applying federal
common law in international cases before state and federal
courts seems ill-advised, given that existing rules of law take ad-
equate consideration of overriding federal, foreign and interna-
tional interests.
" Id. at 222.
7' Id. at 223.
74 Id.
1* Id. at 225.
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